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tribution. Consumption tax is regressive in nature. It hurts the poor more 
than the rich. Additional consumption tax increase may increase the number 
of poor elderly in Japan. Then, new social issues will arise.
The Japanese pension reform is all about the intergeneration share of 
“pie.” Looking at the balance sheet, we learn that the piece of pie the old 
will have is getting smaller and smaller. But, the number of old will be larger. 
The young will have to share their pie with the old. This is not easy since the 
author shows that the 2004 reform made the present value of future beneﬁ  ts 
account for only 80 percent of the present value of future contribution. The 
question is how to make the young willing to share their pie with the old 
when they are not sure that the number of their oﬀspring will not be large 
enough to make a big pie that is shareable?
Comment  Hyungpyo Moon
In his excellent chapter, Professor Takayama provides very comprehensive 
reviews and appraisals of the current pension issues in Japan from the per-
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Fig. 5C.1    Japan’s population by age group
Source: IPSS (www.ipss.go.jp/  site-  ad/  TopPageData/  p_age2.xls, accessed January 30, 2007).
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spectives of ﬁ  nancial sustainability and distributional equity. In particular, 
he analyzes lucidly the contributions and limitations of the 2004 Pension 
Reform in Japan using the ingenuous balance sheet approach, which enables 
separate accounting of past pension liabilities from future ones. He goes 
further to outline a possible new pension reform option that could be more 
sustainable and incentive-  compatible.
As described in the chapter, the 2004 pension reform’s major target is to 
make the pension plans—both earnings-  related pension (KNH) and basic 
pension—more sustainable in a super- aged society. The KNH achieved this 
goal through a substantial increase in contribution rate as well as reduction 
in beneﬁ  t levels. The contribution rate will increase gradually from 13.59 
percent in 2004 to 18.30 percent in 2017. Beneﬁ  ts will be lowered automati-
cally by introducing the built- in stabilizer to neutralize demographic factors, 
which is equivalent to the negative beneﬁ  t adjustment of approximately 0.9 
percentage point per year. By this measure, the average income replacement 
rate of the KNH is projected to decline by 9.1 percentage points during the 
next twenty years. Reduction schedule will be halted in 2023, so that the 
average replacement rate does not fall below the 50 percent level.
The KNH reform in 2004 will undoubtedly enhance its ﬁ  nancial stability. 
However, it is still questionable whether the reform fully recovers the plan’s 
longer- term  ﬁ  nancial sustainability. If the contribution rate will be ﬁ  xed 
after 2017 and beneﬁ  t levels will be ﬁ  xed after 2023, what will happen after 
2023? There is no doubt that population aging in Japan will continue even 
after 2023. According the projections, old-  age dependency rate is expected 
to go up as high as 40 percent in 2052, due to both increased longevity and 
low fertility. This trend will inevitably create ﬁ  nancial shortage problems 
even after 2023, despite the recent reform.
Even if both contribution rate and beneﬁ  t level are ﬁ  xed, we can still 
maintain the plan’s ﬁ  nancial balance by adjusting the minimum pension-
able age. But my question is whether the minimum replacement rate target 
of 50 percent is really the “Masino line” to guarantee social adequacy. The 
2004 reform promised that the KNH replacement rate will not fall below 
the 50 percent level for the full participants. However, many developed 
countries provide less generous public pension beneﬁ  ts and complement 
the inadequacy through fostering corporate/ individual annuity markets. As 
almost all the KNH participants in Japan receive corporate level retirement 
beneﬁ  ts, the total replacement rate can still be high despite the KNH beneﬁ  t 
cut. In addition, increasing the role of private pensions will strengthen the 
prefunding of the entire old-  age income security system, thereby making 
the entire system less vulnerable (more sustainable) to demographic changes. 
Considering this, it seems to me that setting the “adequacy” target for the 
old- age income security system as a whole, rather than for the public pension 
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Professor Takayama proposes that the NHK be converted to the notional 
deﬁ  ned contribution (NDC) plan to make the plan more sustainable and 
more incentive-  compatible. This can be done by separating the past liabil-
ities—or legacy debt—and ﬁ  nancing them through the increase in con-
sumption tax. My second question is whether the NDC is really incentive-
 compatible or actuarially fair. A shift to the NDC will increase the marginal 
linkage between contributions and beneﬁ  ts conceptually: “Every dollar 
counts in the NDC,” as Takayama puts it. However, the NDC is still a PAYGO 
system, and vulnerable to demographic changes. While the unfunded deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ  t plans often neutralize the negative impacts of demographic changes 
by adjusting the beneﬁ  t levels, the NDC does this by adjusting the internal 
rate of return: that is, the rate of return applied to the NDC—notional rate 
of return—is a function of aging factors as well as wage growth rate. Hence, 
increasing longevity and low fertility will inevitably lower the notional rate 
of return. In this case, people still can compare the rate of return on the 
NDC with those of other ﬁ  nancial portfolios to ﬁ  nd out the NDC is not 
attractive (actuarially fair) anyhow.
Another question is whether tax ﬁ  nancing of the past KNH liabilities 
is socially equitable. As mentioned in the chapter, the past liabilities are 
“sunk costs” and can be ﬁ  nanced by tax revenues. An introduction of the 
earmarked consumption tax will not only reduce the deadweight loss, as 
it is more broadly-  based than income taxes, but it will also increase inter-
generational equity as the old generations will share the burden. However, 
the KNH plan is for the employees only, excluding nonemployees. In this 
case, tax ﬁ  nancing of the KNH legacy debt will inevitably result in transfers 
from nonemployees to employees, and thereby creating intragenerational 
inequity.
My ﬁ  nal question is whether a shift to the funded deﬁ  ned contribution 
(FDC) plan cannot be an option in Japan. From the perspectives of ﬁ  nancial 
sustainability and intergenerational equity, the eﬀective countermeasure to 
depopulation would be a transition from the conventional PAYGO system 
to a funded system. Sweden, for example, recently introduced the mandated 
FDC with 2.5 percent of contribution rate to supplement the NDC. Is it 
impossible for Japan to introduce the FDC partially together with a shift 
to the NDC? If the “double taxation burden” problem matters, is it impos-
sible to spread the burden intertemporally through a proper mixture of tax 
ﬁ  nancing and debt ﬁ  nancing?
Professor Takayama also proposes that the current basic pension be shifted 
to a noncontributory universal pension, instead of increasing government’s 
matching subsidy to the basic pension as in the 2004 reform. I agree that this 
shift could solve the noncompliance problem, and improve both eﬃciency 
(by utilizing more broadly-  based consumption tax) and equity (by making 
the system more progressive). In spite of that, one thing we should take into 192    Noriyuki  Takayama
consideration from the perspective of ﬁ  nancial burden is the rapid popu-
lation aging in Japanese society. The signiﬁ  cant demographic changes in 
the future signal that there will be a tremendous increase in ﬁ  nancial bur-
den when a universal noncontributory basic pension is introduced and the 
consumption tax rate will have to increase to a substantial degree, thereby 
reducing economic eﬃciency.